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In The 
SUPREME COURT 
Of The 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID RUSSELL and EILEEN RUSSELL, 
his wife, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs-
Respondents, 
STERLING B. MARTELL d/b/a MARTELL 
HOLDING COMPANY, et al, and 
GRANT C. MILLS, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S PETITION AND BRIEF 
FOR REHEARING 
Supreme Court 
No. 18160 
Appellant respectfully petitions this court for a 
rehearing in this matter on the grounds set out in the points 
which follow and in support thereof submits these facts. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A more complete statement of facts is found in 
appellant's original brief but most of the facts important to 
this petition are briefly given here. 
A default judgment was entered against appellant, 
Grant C. Mills (hereinafter "Mills") on July 29, 1981. Mills 
filed a motion to set aside the default judgment on December 4, 
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1981, and the motion was heard by the lower court on the morning 
of December 10, 1981. The respondent, David Russell 
(hereinafter "Russell") filed an affidavit, at the end of the 
day on December 9, 1981, in which he stated that Mills told him 
that he (Mills) intended to take no action on the summons and 
complaint. -Bec-aus-e the affidavit was filed just prior to the 
hearing on the motion to set aside the default judgment, Mills 
had no opportunity to deny or otherwise respond to Russell's 
statement. In fact, Mills did not even see Russell's affidavit 
prior to the hearing on the motion to set aside the default 
judgment. 
Mills' statement to Russell that he intended to take 
no action on the summons and complaint was made after Russell 
told Mills that he (Russell) "wasn't after me but was just after 
Sterling Martell and Martell Holding Corp." 
Russell's attorney, Mr. Hardy, filed an affidavit, 
also at the end of the day on December 9, 1981, in which he 
stated he had informed Mills of the default judgment against 
him. Mills also did not see this affidavit until after the 
hearing and did not have an opportunity to deny or respond to 
that statement. The fact is that Mills, in response to that 
information from Mr. Hardy, contacted the clerk of the court on 
two different occasions and was told by the clerk that no 
judgment had been entered against him but that a judgment had 
been entered against two other defendants. 
-2-
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The lower court denied the motion to set aside the 
default judgment without specification of the reasons therefor 
and this appeal followed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON "UNDENIED STATEMENTS" 
OF PLAINTIFFS SINCE MILLS HAD NO OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND 
TO OR DENY THOSE STATEMENTS. 
This court's refusal to set aside the default of Mills 
was based upon Mills' "undenied statements that he felt no legal 
obligation to respond to the plaintiffs' claims [which] evince a 
complete indifference by him and negate any diligence on his 
part in pursuing the opportunity to defend." (Supreme Court 
Opinion, pages 2-3) This statement by the court overlooks the 
fact that Mills had no opportunity to deny those statements 
because those statements were made in affidavits submitted by 
plaintiffs at or just prior to the hearing on the motion to set 
aside the default judgment. 
The hearing on Mills' motion was heard on the morning 
of December 10, 1981. Plaitiffs' affidavits in opposition to 
the motion were signed on December 9, 1981, and hand-delivered 
to the office of Mills' attorney at the end of that day. Rule 
6(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires opposing 
affidavits to be served "not later than 1 day before the 
hearing." Rule 2.7(e) of the Rules of Practice in the District 
-3-
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Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah (and its 
predecessor rule) provides that "affidavits not filed within the 
time required by any rule of civil procedure shall not be 
received except on stipulation of the parties or for good cause 
shown." The purpose of these rules is obviously to allow a 
certain minimal time for parties to review and respond to 
affidavits., "Not later than 1 day" must be taken to mean 
"l full day" or the purpose of the rule becomes meaningless. 
Mills had no opportunity to respond to those affidavits and they 
were received and ruled upon by the lower court in violation of 
the rules. 
The statements upon which this court relies in 
refusing to set aside the default represent only half of the 
story. Mills' version of those conversations is set out in his 
affidavit attached to this petition. Mills was told by the 
plaintiff, David Russell, that "he (Russell) wasn't after me 
(Mills) but was just after Sterling Martell and Martell Holding 
Corpo" Under this circumstance it would be natural for Mills to 
respond that he intended to take no action on the summons and 
complaint. His actual response was that "then I shouldn't have 
to take any action, should I?" Russell agreed that he should 
not. However, Russell obviously misrepresented his intent to 
Mills because he did take a judgment against Mills. 
Plaintiffs' attorney, Mr. Hardy, stated in his 
affidavit that he informed Mills by telephone that a default 
judgment had been taken against him. It was in response to this 
-4-
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statement that Mills checked with the clerk's office and was 
informed that no judgment had been taken against him but only 
against Martell and Martell Holding Corp. This was in 
accordance with what Russell had told Mills he would do and, 
therefore, confirmed to Mills that he had no reason for concern. 
Had the clerk discovered the second judgment against Mills in 
the file and reported that to him, he would have immediately 
taken action to have it set aside. As it was, Mills had the 
assurance of Russell that he wasn't after him and the assurance 
of the clerk that no judgment had been taken against him. 
With this full view of the facts, it can hardly be 
said that Mills showed a complete indifference to those facts. 
Instead, he acted very naturally, relying on the statement of 
Russell, who had been a long-time friend and associate. We 
must remember that he was a layman, unaware of the legal rules 
of procedure, who was misled by the plaintiff and by the clerk 
of the court. 
POINT II 
RULE 60(b)(7) WAS INTENDED TO COVER THESE FACTS. 
OTHERWISE, THERE IS NO POSSIBLE RELIEF FOR A 
DEFENDANT WHO IS THE VICTIM OF FRAUD, MISREPRESEN-
TATION OR MISCONDUCT AND HAS NO NOTICE THEREOF FOR 
MORE THAN THREE MONTHS. 
Rule 60(b) states that a motion under the rule should 
be brought within three months after the judgment if the motion 
is based on the first four subparagraphs but within a reasonable 
-5-
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time after the judgment if based on the latter three 
subparagraphs. The three-month limitation on the first four 
grounds is obviously based on the assumption that the party 
against whom the judgment is entered has knowledge that a 
judgment has been entered. If he has such knowledge and fails 
to take any action within three months, the rule assumes he has 
no grounds to have the judgment set aside or that he has 
knowingly waived such grounds. However, if he has no such 
knowledge within the three-month period, it is impossible for 
him to take any action to obtain relief from the judgment 
within that period and it cannot be said that he has knowingly 
waived his rights. Therefore, reason suggests that the three-
month limitation would not begin to run until the judgment 
debtor has notice of the entry of the judgment or that the last 
ground stated ("any other reason justifying relief") was 
intended to cover such situations. Otherwise, it would be 
possible for a plaintiff to cause a judgment to be entered 
against a defendant who does not answer because of fraud, 
misrepresentation, misconduct, mistake, inadvertence, surprise, 
excusable neglect or improper service (all grounds for relief 
from the judgment if asserted within three months) and 
intentionally fail to notify the defendant of the entry of the 
judgment until three months had expired, thereby depriving the 
defendant of his rights under the rule. In this case Russell 
misrepresented to Mills that he was not after him and then took 
a judgment against him but took no action to enforce the 
judgment, which was entered July 29, 1981, until November 24, 
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1981, after the three months had expired. Thus, unless the 
three month period runs only from the time of notice to the 
judgment debtor or unless Rule 60(b)(7), the "any other reason" 
ground, covers this situation, Russell is rewarded for the very 
"fraud, misrepresentation, misconduct" the rule is designed to 
prevent. 
Why did Russell wait for three months to expire 
before taking action to enforce his judgment? Why did Russell 
move so slowly before the three months had expired and so 
quickly afterwards? The potential for abuse of that rule is 
obvious and the court should set aside the default of Mills and 
allow this case to be heard on its merits in order to prevent 
any abuse of that rule. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING DIRECTION TO THE LOWER 
COURT AS TO THE EXTENT OF THE HEARING REQUIRED ON 
REMAND. 
This court has directed the lower court to conduct 
further proceedings in conformity with its opinion. Directions 
are given specifically to "ascertain the amount of damages to 
which the plaintiffs were entitled" and the "amount of income 
• •• received on the security" but, no direction is given 
concerning preliminary issues as to whether plaintiffs are 
entitled to any damages at all. Unless evidence is produced on 
each of the following issues, implicit in plaintiffs' 
complaint, it cannot be determined that plaintiffs are entitled 
to any damages at all: 
-7-
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(1) Whether Mills was in fact a licensed securities 
agent; 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
Whether the note constituted a security 
requiring registration; 
Whether there existed any exemption from such 
registration, for example, as an isolated 
transaction [§61-l-14(2)(a)] or as secured 
indebtedness [§61-l-14(2)(e)]; 
Whether any-representations were made to 
Russells by Mills; 
Whether those representations were true or 
false; 
Whether Russells knew of the untruth of the 
representations; and 
Whether Mills knew, or in the exercise of 
reasonable care could have known, of the untruth 
of the representationse 
In order to consider that kind of evidence, the lower 
court should conduct a full hearing and must allow Mills to 
participate in and present his own evidence at that hearing. 
The plaintiffs' complaint does not contain any allegations with 
respect to items 3, 6 and 7, above, and, therefore, even if all 
allegations of the complaint were taken to be true, plaintiffs 
have not established a prima facie case. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the court's opinion is based upon an untrue 
assumption that Mills had an opportunity to deny or respond to 
the statements of plaintiffs and since the matter of the fraud, 
misrepresentation or misconduct of plaintiffs without notice of 
a judgment to Mills and of the extent of the hearing required 
-8-
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on remand were not considered by the court, a rehearing is 
necessary to consider these issues. 
Appellant requests that the court set aside his 
default and allow a full hearing on the merits to be held. 
Otherwise, the very fraud, misrepresentation and misconduct, 
that Rule 60(b) was designed to prevent, will have been 
condoned by the court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
By\(~~ 
Ra p • Marsh 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
-9-
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AFFIDAVIT 
Supreme Court 
No. 18160 
GRANT C. MILLS, being first duly sworn, on oath, 
deposes and says as follows: 
1. That I am one of the defendants and the appellant 
in the above-entitled case. 
2. That some time in July 1981 I had a conversation 
with the plaintiff David Russell in which Russell said that he 
wasn't after me but was just after Sterling Martell and Martell 
Holding Corp., 
3. My response to him was "then I shouldn't have to 
take any action, should I?" He agreed that I should not. 
4. That in August of 1981 I was informed by David 
Eccles Hardy that a judgment had been taken against me. I 
responded that I did not feel legally obligated to the 
plaintiffs. 
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5. However, in response to the statement by Mr. Hardy, 
I contacted the clerk of the court and inquired if a judgment had 
been entered against me. The clerk responded that no judgment had 
been taken against me but that a judgment had been taken against 
Sterling Martell and Martell Holding Corporation. 
6. I did not understand the effect of a judgment and 
did not know my responsibility with respect thereto but had sent 
the summons and complaint to my attorney and assumed that 
appropriate responses had been filed. 
7. I attended the hearing on the motion to set aside 
the default judgment on the morning of December 10, 1981, but 
did not see the affidavits filed by plaintiff in opposition to 
the motion until after the hearing was completed. I wanted to 
say something during the hearing in response to claims the 
plantiffs were making but was told that I could not. 
DATED this 21st day of February, 1984. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 21st day of 
February, 1984. 
My commission expires: '1/-µJ/7t, Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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